Book Review: The Virtue of Nationalism

The Virtue of Nationalism by Yoram Hazony

Basic Books, New York, 2018

The term Nationalism, as a descriptor of political philosophy, cultural identity, and governance methodology has been undergoing a reexamination in recent years. This evaluation is resulting in political lines being starkly drawn around how civil and partisan engagement is to be exercised among the citizens of 21st century sovereign states. The significant emergence of populist right-wing movements in a number of western countries during the 2010s is forcing us to review the advantages and disadvantages wrought upon societies and economies concerning the manner in which globalization’s interactions and integrations have been playing out over the past thirty or forty years. By investigating the way in which global exchange practices are developing in this increasingly hyper-connected world we can better determine whether nationalism, a profoundly universal social innovation, which emerged from the Enlightenment three centuries ago, continues to be a beneficial and relevant social organizing principle going forward.

Recent reading and podcast listening of mine in the areas of politics, economics, and philosophy has brought to my attention the latest work from Yoram Hazony, an Israeli political philosopher, entitled The Virtue of Nationalism. The impression initially given to me from the above sources is that this work is popular among conservative intellectuals as a serious promotion of nationalism’s positive effects and praiseworthy underpinnings going well beyond mere political theater and hyperbole to instead a revealing and scholarly justification of the concept’s current embrace among many on the political right.

Nationalism used to have a positive connotation with me, but since the Trump phenomenon its reputation now seems personally tarnished by its associations with xenophobia, jingoism, racism, and extremism. All told, this seemed like a good time to try understanding my political opposition more by peering into an erudite attempt to explain nationalism’s measure, worth, and modern relevance.

I went into this reading with a view of nationalism shaped largely by two influences, one my study of conventional American history, which by and large speaks of American nationalism as a blessed and hard fought gift to the world, created out of righteous revolution and gallantly sustained throughout numerous external threats and invasions. Secondly, beyond the American experience, I’ve observed nationalism as the glue that has held the world’s people together in an appropriate order of self-governing societies bound by common histories, languages, cultural traits, and religions. My key observations are that nationalism encourages pride, patriotism, and a rallying of collective spirit, leaving each citizen feeling as if they belong to something grand and historic. The national state model allows people to join in a synergistic manner to establish and protect their independent means of continuing prosperity and cultural longevity while safeguarding themselves against external threats. If one nation can’t defend its interests alone, then it joins in alliances with others whom they share concerns. I have always thought this arrangement was a marked improvement over the primitive feudalism of previous eras with its near constant bloodshed and tyrannical rule. Overall, nationalism has felt natural and fitting — until this time.

Nationalism has become a political hot potato and as with many topics of late with which there should not be widespread disagreement, such as environmental protection, universal access to healthcare, and shared prosperity, nationalism is now the cause célèbre, pitting those on the right, who seek a return to an allegedly diminished sovereignty, with liberals who view cooperative global connectivity among peoples as inevitable and positive.

For many, nationalism has revealed a dark side. Areas of contention include claims that a form of neo-nationalism in the west has arisen of late characterized by regressive and revisionist thinking; claims of racial superiority; intolerance of diversity; an embrace of outmoded social behaviors; denial or rejection of cultural and historical changes now underway; less respect for the rights of all citizens; a willingness to increase conflict with other countries such as allies; and less readiness to initiate and establish international alliances. In short, a debate now exists about whether or not nationalism contributes to universal welfare, peace, and prosperity around the planet or if it is instead an outdated relic of a more pugnacious and bellicose past.

Also, nationalism now has a novel and disturbing face to it. Donald Trump, Brexit supporters, eastern European strongmen, white supremacists, and angry old white men (and some women) many of whom possess only a basic level of formal education. It’s reasonable to ask, can there be anything redeemable of an idea endorsed enthusiastically by this lot?

To be fair, there have undoubtedly been tensions leading to a reassessment of how international relations are deployed and of globalization’s value more broadly. Growing numbers of Americans and Europeans see unsustainable and uncontrollable levels of immigration occurring; trade agreements that seem to favor cheap labor abroad at the expense of domestic workers; technological and business shifts overly favoring the highly educated; greater corporate empowerment leading to increased wealth inequality; terrorism targeted at the wealthy nations; and a sense that multi-state federations and alliances, such as the European Union, United Nations, and NATO, are weakening nations’ ability to determine their own policy initiatives and address adequately their own unique national interests.

Together these issues have called into question our rush to tightly connect the world technologically, economically, politically, and culturally. Many are welcoming this set of challenges as an excuse to reaffirm the benefits of nationalism and caution against any alternatives away from it.

Yoram Hazony constructs a thoughtful, well researched, ardent, and academic defense of nationalism, placing the practice in a long-term historical context. For critics of  nationalism as it has become to be understood today, in particular as a reactionary political movement, it is worth reading this sober and reasoned rationale advocating a means of governing and ordering of societies that is still quite recent in the annals of history. One element of credibility I expected from Hazony was his perspective on the topic as an Israeli citizen and self-admitted Zionist. The Hebrew nation was intentionally forged from centuries of enmity, bigotry, conflict, and genocide, providing Hazony and perhaps all Israelis, with a profound reverence for a system codifying independence, self-reliance, and empowerment for the Jewish people. He did indeed deliver his thesis from this vantage point, giving his claims added authenticity, if not veracity.

A principal dichotomy Hazony relies on to gird his central argument is the fundamental choice countries must make between having governments rooted in self-determined independent sovereignty or authoritative and centrally planned multi-state aggregations. The question is which system is worthy of development that best advances freedom, prosperity, peace, and moral integrity. Is it a belief countries should be free to pursue their interests, further their cultural traditions, and navigate their way through a world brimming with threats and opportunities? Or is it one ingrained with the notion global integration is a requirement for reducing racism and belligerence, while promoting tolerance, fellowship, and fairness? In other words, Hazony views the essential preference as one between nationalism and imperialism.

Hazony reaches into history to provide guidance and justification for the crucial ruling decision nations must make today. Empire has a long track record in the western world stretching back to Assyria, Persia, Babylonia, and Egypt. It is due to the latter empire with its authoritarian brutality and forced devotion to polytheism and pharaonic command, which gave rise to the reactive origins of nationalism found in the Old Testament. The Bible became the first document to present a political order alternative to imperialism as well as the tradition preceding it, tribalism. Of note, Mosaic law prohibited Israelites from launching incursions into nearby kingdoms and stipulated internal governing standards, which together formed the early parameters of the national state.

Later significant expression of nationalism occurred during the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. Rejection of the imperialistic Roman Church, following the invention of the printing press, occurred in England, Scotland, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden, leading eventually to the Thirty Years’ War, which broke the Roman church’s hold over much of Europe, resulting in the formation of national states throughout the continent. A common attribute of these nations was a self-proclaimed right of self-determination and adoption of moral requirements determining the legitimacy of governments, often codified in constitutions. This continued to serve as the building model of most nations reaching into the 20th century.

Nationalism today has been altered substantially by two penetrating developments—the philosophical emergence of what Hazony calls the “liberal construction of the West” and Germany’s 20th century attempts to forcefully apply nationalism as a springboard for empire building. In the first case, western political thought has been dominated since John Locke (1689) by a sanctified belief in individual rights and consent. By superseding loyalty and kinship to cultural, religious, and tribal origins with individual freedom and equality the nation state loses its moral fiber and tradition-bound purpose. In addition, the rationale for national boundaries is diluted or seen as unnecessary in a liberal world where universal principles that improve the lives of all humankind can be put into practice the world over. Hazony complains that defense of old-styled nationalism is not even given the time of day among the multiparty educated elites who are all in with the Lockean paradigm.

Germany saw the nations of England, France, Spain, and Portugal forming colonial empires around the world and thought they should have one too. The difference with the Germans was in their belief that instead of colonizing far-flung parts of the world they could establish their empire in Europe. Hence, World Wars I and II. Following the atrocities of Nazi Germany, a conclusion widely accepted was to believe nationalism could be inherently extreme and the cause of such horrendous crimes. By taking away their status of nationhood peace and prosperity would instead reign over Europe.

The result of these traumas is that the true national state, as Hazony sees it, has given way to a neo-imperialism most glaringly expressed in the European Union, United Nations, and Pax Americana. The faith buttressing these entities assumes the western world has identified liberalism, by which is included the rule of law, market economies, and individual rights as the true all-encompassing way to achieve peace and prosperity. He contends this comes at the expense of a conviction in nationalism based on self-determination and moral allegiance principles as the correct and proper way to govern. As is obvious to him, this doctrine can best be achieved via international alliances and other state integration schemes, which smack of imperialism and a drift away from sovereignty. The current wave of nationalism in Europe. Brazil, the U.S. and elsewhere is a rejection of the liberal construction of the West and the neocolonialism it implies.

Mr. Hazony attempts a reasoned case for his preference of nationalism over the other major political order alternatives, those being clans/tribes and imperialism. He basis his claim not on mere emotional devotion or an infatuation with institutional tradition alone, but through a carefully constructed logic centered on the ultimate eminence of people’s mutual loyalty to one another. Beginning with an endorsement of the idea that political order needs to precede philosophies of government he goes on to recognize politics as a means of persuasion uniting like interests of a community toward achieving common goals. Members of any collective join for one of three reasons: they are coerced, paid off, or see the aims of the group as sharing in the same values as their own individual aspirations. This latter motive, the most influential of the three, leads to an all powerful mutual loyalty, which is foundational to the formation of families, clans, tribes, successful institutions, and nations themselves.

The precious bond of mutual loyalty, progressively arising as it does from families and clans to tribes and nations, outweighs in importance personal gain, one’s survival instinct, and even the ability to live totally free and independent, according to Hazony. Any philosophy of government must take into account this fundamental truth — group cohesion resulting from reciprocal fidelity creates the highest quality and sustainable associations and institutions. To diminish or to be blind to this tenet is to follow a path toward enabling organizations with weak attachments and a fragile ability to meet threats, to benefit from opportunities, or to satisfy the individual needs of constituents. He accuses the current liberal construction of the West as falling into this trap by relying solely on individual consent and freedom as the keystone of government.

Hazony offers a useful analogy to make his point, by which he compares the two institutions of business and family. In business, employees and customers engage with the organization to greater and lesser degrees depending primarily on an expectation of what benefits are to be derived which will enhance one’s lifestyle and material well being. We could say it is a consensual relationship. The family, on the other hand, is comprised of members to whom one is devoted well beyond what comforts they provide. Indeed, family members may be quite difficult, nevertheless parents largely accept the obligation to pass on cultural inheritances to their children, which they had received from their parents, grandparents, and ancestors. The commitment to one another within families is a much stronger bond than is found elsewhere, particularly more so than within commercial relations. The claim is therefore made that a true lasting connection to one another in a nation is much closer to family than to business.

Nationalism is the sweet spot between the rule of clans and tribes, which leads to near constant warfare and anarchy, and empire with its inevitability of subjugation. It is only in the national state where citizens of common heritage, language, religion, and history join to form and give allegiance to a political order that in turn provides national freedom to all. Hazony claims a collective freedom must precede individual freedom and to think any individual can be free when their family or fellow citizens are not is folly. National freedom as expressed in free institutions and domestic power centers strengthens domestic peace and common well-being. Moreover, national freedom is founded on a empirical belief that the truths which hold a people together must result from a plurality of viewpoints over time rather than from a single universal precept delivered on high.

Hazony concludes his book by trying to address one persistent criticism of nationalism — the charge it promotes intolerance and hatred. The counter argument boils down basically to: ‘Well, imperialist movements do so too.’ Finally, much time is spent defending Israel’s nationalism, which frankly to me appears as an open and shut case given the history Jews have faced, despite their inability thus far to temper or mitigate the aggressiveness imposed by them onto their neighbors.

In general, I have to give Hazony credit for laying out a solid case for the continuance of nationalism. I agree with much of his rationale. Primarily, his placement of nationalism between tribalism and imperialism and his critique of these extremes is credible. A political order whereby individuals are able to benefit from established cultural teachings, uphold the future of their civilization, and further an idiosyncratic but legitimate expression of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is clearly acceptable. I embrace an approval of intercultural diversity, tolerance of differences among peoples, and a context requiring negotiation among disparate parties. A world of national states sets the stage for such interaction. He makes an obvious case that tribalism and imperialism impede such a scrum in favor of a more minimized and overly reductionist outlook favoring restricted thinking of how communal interplay should occur.

It’s also hard to quarrel with the value of mutual loyalty among like people, a fundamental dogma of his pro-nationalism argument. The bond folk experience from common backgrounds, values, and interests is profound and motivating. The sense of belonging is integral to personal mental and therefore collective health. Anyone who feels pride in their heritage, which is most individuals, knows how significant fealty and homage to one’s people is. Such fidelity to a group’s ancestors and the culture they imparted over generations should be honored, refined, and respected. However, it is on this overarching topic of mutual loyalty where I begin to question Hazony’s premise.

He makes clear that there are limits to mutual loyalty. In Hazony’s nationalistic world citizens begin forming the bonds of loyalty first to their families and from there to their local communities and to country. Historically, loyalty followed a path from family to clan to tribe and over time to nation. But that is as far as collaborative devotion can apparently reach. His claim is that without the ties of tradition loyalty toward others dissolves. What we are left with at best is a grasping of like interests from which to form political alliances with those outside of our cultural and national sphere. The default position is that members of a nation exclusively contain a limited and unique set of objectives necessary to sustain their people which are not shared with foreigners. And because there is not a universal commonly accepted principle that applies to everyone around the planet, or so he says, there is a natural constraint as to how far mutual loyalty can go. I ask myself, are the world’s inhabitants really that separate and different from each another?

Technology and a global economy join people in interdependent ways. We rely on each other for our common welfare and bounty in ways that is increasingly difficult to do at just a national level alone. International trade and cultural exchanges benefit a nation beyond what domestic practices, policies, and programs alone can do in the modern era. Not only that, but global climate change places everyone in the same existential boat. Our very survival no matter where we live is largely subservient to how global decision makers react to the scientific data beckoning us to act in a coordinated manner. Do we not jointly participate in a world marked more by what unites us than what divides us? Is not our common need to live fruitful lives in the here and now, while fashioning a plentiful future for our children, the elusive universal principle Hazony claims does not exist?

Hazony seems to have a limited view regarding the foundational thinking pertaining to political order, which emerged from the 18th century’s age of reason known as the Enlightenment. He restricts it to Locke’s reasoned claim of “perfect freedom” and “perfect equality” or in short, individual freedom, as the one grand unifying principle driving the theory of government that now dominates the West. However, I suggest expanding the notion of what qualifies as ordering principles derived from the Enlightenment beyond just individual freedom, as noteworthy as it is. Other conditions conventionally thought of as forming the basis of the good life inspire contemporary political action as well. Steven Pinker highlighted such requirements in his book Enlightenment Now (2018). In addition to freedom and happiness he identifies health and longevity; sustenance and abundance; peace and safety; literacy and knowledge; and environmental quality as critical outcomes all people should experience. Surely, attempts to ensure individual freedom and results such as those noted by Pinker together serve as a more complete unifying principle agreeable to all nations supporting a theory of government. Perhaps Martin Luther King put it best: “We are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of mutuality. And whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly.”

To be clear, the above criticism is not a rationale for empire building. Hazony lays out quite well the pitfalls of a single multinational governmental structure. I agree the loss of national sovereignty can lead to a weakening of culture and a reduction of local decision making, both of which fly in the face of self-determination.

Be that as it may, Hazony singles out the European Union as a particularly flawed imperialistic gamble personifying the way nations should not be going. As is obvious, the EU is modeled on federalism and is populated largely with nations and citizens who want to be a part of it, especially now that the UK is gone. Advantages of the union include protection of basic political, social, and economic rights through implementation of a single market with no cross-border transaction fees; high uniform standards of food safety, consumer and employment rights, and environmental regulations; added global relations clout coming from a unified voice instead of 27 smaller voices; enhanced minority citizen rights; and more. Above all, the greatest benefit to date is the degree of relative peace throughout the European continent. After the bellicose debacles of the twentieth century this is no small achievement. I find it difficult to share Hazony’s glum assessment of the EU’s impact on governance and on the lives of European citizens.

Lest one think Yoram Hazony is simply a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, I would like to point out a fundamental point of his that popular liberalism can take comfort in. He goes to some lengths criticizing individual consent or freedom as inadequate on its own for basing a political theory. Indeed, this is the crux of his problem with the historic liberal construction of the West. Rather, he expounds on the virtues of mutual loyalty as the crucial missing component of current western political thought. What Hazony then actually does is to promote collectivism, community, and public cooperation as paramount while debasing an over-reliance on individualism. This plays right into the popular liberalism of American Democrats and European Social Democrats and says to popular conservatism in the West that its ideology is left wanting.

In summary, Yoram Hazony has prepared a sagacious defense of nationalism that I recommend to anyone drawn to a consideration of political theory, governing principles, and what is motivating the political right these days. Yet, I’m still left with the feeling that to promote nationalism without explicitly condemning its obvious shortcomings in the areas of racism and intolerance, not to mention the impracticality of isolation in a commercially globalized world, is leaving me somewhat unconvinced of Hazony’s brand of nationalism’s purity. Also, I don’t get that if in an empire one member’s national views are disregarded by the empire’s leaders it is despotism, but within the nation state if a minority’s views are ignored by a nation’s leaders it is an accepted price to be paid for the larger good of nationalism, then I see an inconsistency.

But even with these foibles I cannot support a removal of nationalism in favor of a one-world government. Nationalism is a system that may need reform, but not revolution. And thanks to Hazony, I can now better separate nationalism’s true value from the lunatic rhetoric delivered by the cast of nationalistic characters on today’s political stage.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Distributive Work Gets A Boost

One of the significant consequences foisted upon the economy during the Covid-19 outbreak has been the rapid scaling of work completed outside of the office, i.e., at home. What is commonly known as remote work, now increasingly being referred to as distributive work, has been increasing over the past twenty years or so. But in its short history it never has experienced a shot of practice like it is getting now. 

My guess is that distributive work is conventionally thought of across most businesses as secondary in its productive impact relative to being onsite, not unlike the way online courses have tried shaking off their reputation of being course lite. However, the severity of social distancing to break the chain of virus transmission is forcing the knowledge economy to rely on high quality distributive work to stay alive as never before. Indeed, it is in the knowledge economy, comprised of smart and skilled workers producing goods and services worldwide, where distributive work holds its greatest promise. 

It may be useful to know the thoughts of someone who has pioneered and cultivated distributive work for years and is now a leading voice in the movement. Matt Mullenweg was one of the founding developers of WordPress, the digital content management system, and founder of the diversified internet company Automattic with ~1200 employees distributed over 70 countries. He continues to not only evangelize distributive work but leads a set of companies that practice it daily. 

He is also convinced distributive work need not be just an off-the-shelf option management reaches for during times of disruption, but a model of productivity capable of surpassing the performance of traditional office-setting work. 

Mullenweg promotes worker autonomy as key to motivation and efficiency and is much more concerned with worker output than input. While retaining some in-person collaboration, but in a much more reduced and targeted manner, he recognizes the impediments of cramming a lot of people onto a single site. A myriad of distractions such as office politics, intrusive co-workers and managers, long off-topic chats with co-workers, shared facilitates, a narrow set of expected in-house behaviors, and a feeling of having little control over likes and dislikes from the office temperature to the smell of someone’s lunch can all negatively factor into the worker feeling a lack of autonomy. 

With that in mind he identifies five levels of distributive work from low to high effectiveness. To quickly summarize: 

  • Level 1, which is now old-school, has workers using telephone and email offsite to augment their work, but with the belief that the “real” work is done at the office. 
  • Level 2 is an attempt to recreate the office elsewhere by use of VPN and conferencing software to supplement voice and email. Most business is still mired in levels 1 and 2. 
  • Level 3 demonstrates an intentional effort to adopt the best software and equipment available to share knowledge seamlessly and transparently across the organization. This can include good lighting, microphones, and communication tools like Zoom, Slack, and P2. 
  • Level 4 places a premium on asynchronous and written communication, meaning to move away from an over-reliance on live interactions. The goal here is to improve the quality of decision making even if its pace is slowed. 
  • Level 5 is where production capability is shown to be measurably improved over traditional work methods. 

Mullenweg contends the manufacturing factory model of all employees looking busy at the same time and in the same place does not always translate well into the cognitive economy. By valuing quantifiable and qualitative output primarily and providing workers with the means necessary to cooperatively join forces across distance the “workplace” can be not only redefined but rendered more fruitful. 

Looking for a humane and profitable opportunity amidst a global contagion may be difficult. Perhaps, refining distributive work is one such occasion.